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Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Plight of
Health Care Arbitration Agreements
Under Federal Law
I. INTRODUCTION
During the national health care reform debate that gripped the
United States in 2009, President Barack Obama addressed the
American Medical Association. Speaking of a number of proposed
reforms, President Obama stated, “Now, I recognize that it will be
hard to make some of these changes if doctors feel like they’re
constantly looking over their shoulders for fear of lawsuits.”1 After
describing a number of proposals to reform medical malpractice, the
President wrapped up the subject by stating, “So this is going to be a
priority for me. And I know, based on your responses, it’s a priority
for you. . . . But all this stuff is going to be difficult. All of it’s going
to be important.”2
One element of the doctor-patient relationship that has not
received much attention in the recent health care reform frenzy is the
use of medical arbitration agreements. Arbitration is a form of
alternative dispute resolution whereby parties select one or more
unofficial persons to resolve a disputed matter instead of resorting to
a judicial proceeding.3 An arbitration agreement is essentially a
contract to arbitrate, and no party can be required to arbitrate a
claim unless that party has agreed to submit to arbitration.4 By
agreeing to arbitration, parties trade the procedural safeguards
available in the courtroom for the “simplicity, informality, and
expedition of arbitration.”5 Thus, as with all contracts, arbitration
agreements are a way that parties allocate rights between themselves.
The extent to which such agreements are enforceable—whether

1. Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by the President at the Annual
Conference of the American Medical Association (June 15, 2010) (on file with author).
2. Id.
3. 4 Am. Jur. 2d Alternative Dispute Resolution § 2 (2010).
4. Id. §§ 2, 46.
5. Id. § 2.
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under the common law or state statutes—can have important
implications for the parties’ relationship.
Lawmakers and judges are increasingly recognizing arbitration
agreements as an important and evolving area of medical malpractice
law. This Comment will discuss the delicate balance that policymakers and judges have forged between stemming the tide of
frivolous medical malpractice cases and doing justice for the wronged
patient.6 In doing so, it will explore Utah’s Health Care Malpractice
Act (“UHCMA”)7 as a convenient case study of this balancing act.
Although politically controversial,8 the UHCMA represents a
common state-law practice of codifying provisions governing the
enforceability of arbitration agreements.9 At the same time, the
6. For a thorough review of the relative merits of arbitration for doctors and patients,
see, e.g., Stanley A. Leasure & Kent P. Ragan, Arbitration of Medical Malpractice Claims:
Patient’s Dilemma and Doctor’s Delight? 28 MISS. C. L. REV. 51, 57–58 (2009); Kenneth A.
DeVille, The Jury is Out: Pre-Dispute Binding Arbitration Agreements for Medical Malpractice
Claims, 28 J. LEGAL MED. 333, 356–62 (2007). Although the various policy considerations
inherent in arbitration are beyond the scope of this Comment, a perusal of the cited portions
of the articles above reveals no clear answer as to which party medical arbitration will favor.
The truth is most likely that both doctors and patients make trade-offs when it comes to
arbitration. Sorting through these competing interests must therefore fall squarely on state
legislatures. An examination of the FAA and the MFA in this Comment will reveal that the
more explicit the legislative findings concerning the aims and purposes behind these state
statutes, the better.
7. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-421 (2008).
8. As discussed below, the current UHCMA represents enormous effort on the part of
legislators, medical industry lobbyists, and patients’ rights groups to work out a tenable
compromise. See Greg Burton, IHC Policy Gets an Earful, SALT LAKE TRIB., Nov. 29, 2003, at
A1 (reporting public outcry to arbitration policies enacted by Utah’s largest health care
provider, IHC); Lois M. Collins, Doctors Turn to Arbitration, DESERET NEWS, Oct. 14, 2003,
at B01 (discussing various justifications advanced by doctors for their increased use of
arbitration agreements); Lois M. Collins, Arbitration Foes Rally to Protect IHC Policy,
DESERET NEWS, Dec. 24, 2003, at B01 (“The debate on medical arbitration has heated up
considerably since IHC’s physician group sent out letters to its patients telling them if they
think a doctor harms them they must settle it in arbitration rather than the court system.”);
Carey Hamilton, Protestors: Arbitrate This, IHC!, SALT LAKE TRIB., Dec. 3, 2003, at C1.
9. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-485 (LexisNexis 2005); ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.535
(2008); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1295 (West 2007), limited on constitutional grounds by
Rodriguez v. Superior Court, 176 Cal. App. 4th 1461 (2009); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1364-403 (West 2005) (discussed in the reverse preemption context below); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
766.207 (West 2005); 710 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 15/9 (West 2007); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 417.050 (LexisNexis 2005), limited on preemption grounds by In re Transport Associates,
Inc., 263 B.R. 531, 533 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2001); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4231 (2009);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2912g (West 2000); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-15-1 (2004);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23A-20 (West 2010); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4406-a (McKinney
2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.60 (2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.23 (LexisNexis
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Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) preempts state laws that restrict the
enforceability of arbitration agreements or place them on different
“footing” than other contracts.10 Some state courts, facing the
preemption question, have concluded that the McCarran-Ferguson
Act (“MFA”)11 will “reverse preempt” the FAA and allow states to
legislate in this area.12 There are, however, logical inconsistencies in
extending the MFA—originally enacted to address insurance
regulation—to medical arbitration agreements. Hence, this
Comment will ultimately argue that, in view of existing problems
and inadequate alternatives, Congress should amend the FAA to
exempt pre-dispute medical arbitration agreements from FAA
preemption.
Very little of the scholarly discussion surrounding arbitration
examines specific state statutes and their consistency with current
federal law. Accordingly, this Comment fills a gap in the literature by
demonstrating how the UHCMA and other state statutes run afoul
of the FAA and discusses why preemption is often misunderstood or
ignored by courts, legislatures, and commentators. Part II of this
Comment will examine portions of the UHCMA in some detail and
discuss a Utah appellate case that will factor into the FAA and MFA
analysis in later Parts. Part II will also compare the UHCMA to a
number of different statutes in other states containing similar
provisions. Part III will then discuss the FAA and relevant federal
and state cases that address the issue of preemption and highlight
some of the problems with state statutes under current federal law,
identifying, in addition to Utah’s statute, at least eight statutes that

2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-3-2 (1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-25B-3 (2004); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 29-5-101 (2000); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 7002 (2002); VA. CODE ANN. §
8.01-581.12 (2007); see also Fillmore Buckner, A Physician’s Perspective on Mediation
Arbitration Clauses in Physician-Patient Contracts, 28 CAP. U. L. REV 307, 319–20 (2000)
(offering practical advice for physicians implementing arbitration agreements either under
specific state health care arbitration statutes or the state’s version of the Uniform Arbitration
Act).
10. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 289 (2002) (reasoning that Congress
enacted the FAA to “place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other contracts”).
11. 15 U.S.C. §1012(b) (2006). The MFA mandates that state law controls where it is
passed for “the purpose of regulating the business of insurance.” Id.
12. See infra Part IV.C.
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should be preempted under the FAA.13 Part IV then identifies three
reasons for the current confused state of the law, offering a detailed
look at the MFA and a critique of reverse preemption in this context.
Finally, Part V offers a brief conclusion.
II. ARBITRATION UNDER STATE LAW
Setting forth statutory enforceability standards for arbitration
agreements is a dynamic and evolving approach, both on a state and
national level. This Part will first briefly discuss unconscionability,
which represents a common approach to regulating medical
malpractice arbitration agreements in the absence of statutory
provisions. It will then examine Utah’s statutory alternative, the
UHCMA, which sets forth a codified standard for enforceability. It
will also discuss a Utah appellate case that explores the policies
underlying the Utah arbitration provisions and provides background
for some of the analysis in the following Parts. Finally, this Part
examines provisions from a number of other states in order to
demonstrate a crucial comparative link between the UHCMA and
other statutory regimes.
A. Unconscionability: Utah’s Conceptual Precursor to
Arbitration Statutes
Because courts often look to common law contract defenses such
as unconscionability where no state statute specifically regulates the
enforceability of arbitration agreements, these defenses are an
important element of arbitration agreement enforceability. In the
doctor-patient context, almost all challenges to arbitration
agreements arise from a doctor’s efforts to compel arbitration under
an agreement previously signed by a patient. Understanding the
common law defenses asserted by patients is key to understanding
why legislatures, seeking to balance the equities between doctors and
patients, might favor a statutory alternative.

13. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.535 (2008); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1295 (West 2007);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-64-403 (West 2005); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.60 (2009);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.23 (LexisNexis 2008); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4406-a
(McKinney 2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-25B-3 (2004); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 7002
(2002).
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To illustrate one such case, consider Sosa v. Paulos, Utah’s
seminal decision on unconscionability.14 In Sosa, the Utah Supreme
Court refused to enforce an arbitration agreement where the patient
signed the agreement, along with two other documents, less than an
hour before her scheduled surgery when she was already dressed for
the procedure.15 The patient claimed that she felt “rushed and
hurried” by the process and did “not realistically contemplate
postponement or cancellation [of her procedure] at that late
stage.”16 The physician argued that no one told the patient that she
was required to sign the document to proceed to surgery and that
the patient had all the time that she needed to read the documents
and ask any questions that she had.17 The court held that the
agreement was procedurally unconscionable and, ultimately,
unenforceable.18 After identifying six factors relevant to procedural
unconscionability,19 the court reasoned that the arbitration

14. Sosa is commonly cited by commentators nation-wide in their discussion of
unconscionability doctrine. See, e.g., Robert S. Adler & Elliot M. Silverstein, When David Meets
Goliath: Dealing with Power Differentials in Negotiations, 5 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 45
n.173 (2000) (noting that Sosa stands for the proposition that “procedural unconscionability,
if extreme, can nullify contract term which is not substantively unconscionable”); Lucian A.
Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in Competitive Consumer Markets, 104
MICH. L. REV. 827, 829 n.8 (2006); Kenneth R. Davis, The Arbitration Claws:
Unconscionability in the Securities Industry, 78 B.U. L. REV. 255, 284 n.176, 291 n.219
(1998); Paul Bennett Marrow, Squeezing Subjectivity from the Doctrine of Unconscionability, 53
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 187, 204 (2006) (“Sosa v. Paulos illustrates the lengths that a court will go
to impose its views about public policy.”) (footnote omitted); David G. Wirtes, Jr., Suggestions
for Defeating Arbitration, 24 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 111, 139–40 n.114 (2000) (suggesting
unconscionability factors that may bear on whether an arbitration agreement may be enforced);
Carol A. Crocca, Annotation, Arbitration of Medical Malpractice Claims, 24 A.L.R. 5th 1
(2010) (discussed in a supplemental update covering contracts not governed by statute); 17
C.J.S. Contracts § 151 (Supp. 2009).
15. 924 P.2d 357, 362–63 (Utah 1996).
16. Id. at 362.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 364–65.
19. Id. at 362. The six factors are as follows:
(1) whether each party had a reasonable opportunity to understand the terms and
conditions of the agreement; (2) whether there was a lack of opportunity for
meaningful negotiation; (3) whether the agreement was printed on a duplicate or
boilerplate form drafted solely by the party in the strongest bargaining position; (4)
whether the terms of the agreement were explained to the weaker party; (5) whether
the aggrieved party had a meaningful choice or instead felt compelled to accept the

1873

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2/1/2011 5:31 PM

2010

agreement was not negotiated in a fair manner and that the patient
did not have a meaningful choice regarding whether to sign.20 The
court further reasoned that the physician could have taken the time
to discuss the agreement with the patient prior to the surgery to give
her a “somewhat reasonable opportunity to understand the terms
and conditions of the agreement.”21 Instead, a staff person gave the
patient the document without explanation when the patient was
already dressed and nervous about the surgery. Although parties to a
contract usually have a duty to read and understand a contract before
signing it, “that duty is obviated when the party’s failure to read the
agreement results from the . . . behavior of the party in the stronger
bargaining position.”22
The result in Sosa is by no means typical. Rather, as one court
noted, of all cases where courts consider whether unconscionability
may defeat an otherwise valid arbitration agreement, “[m]ost have
rejected the claim.”23 Nevertheless, Sosa is important in illustrating
one way that state contract law may operate to defeat an arbitration
agreement.24 In Utah, courts have express statutory authority to
“decide whether an agreement to arbitrate exists or [whether] a
controversy is subject to an agreement to arbitrate.”25 However, as
the next section illustrates, since Sosa, the Utah legislature has

terms of the agreement; and (6) whether the stronger party employed deceptive
practices to obscure key contractual provisions.
Id. (internal citations omitted). These factors are among those used by other courts in
considering procedural unconscionability, even in cases where the court ultimately finds the
agreement enforceable. See, e.g., Cleveland v. Mann, 942 So.2d 108, 114 (Miss. 2006); see
also, Leasure & Ragan, supra note 6, at 58–60 (discussing Mann and Sosa to contrast cases in
which state courts reached opposite results on procedural unconscionability in medical
malpractice arbitration cases).
20. Sosa, 924 P.2d. at 363.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See In re Conseco Fin. Servicing Corp., 19 S.W.3d 562, 570 n.3 (Tex. App. Waco
2000) (citing Sosa among a number of cases dealing with procedural unconscionability).
24. Unconscionability is one way that arbitration agreements are commonly invalidated
notwithstanding the FAA’s strong presumption in favor of arbitration agreement validity. See 9
U.S.C. § 2 (2006); see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-11-107(1) (2008) (expressly
incorporating the language from section 2 of the FAA that an agreement to arbitrate is “valid,
enforceable, and irrevocable except upon a ground that exists at law or in equity for the
revocation of a contract”) (emphasis added).
25. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-11-107(2).
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enacted a comprehensive guide for courts, setting out requirements
for enforceable arbitration agreements.
B. Statutory Framework of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act
The Utah Legislature passed the UHCMA in response to a
growing number of health care suits and the increasing amount of
the settlements in the years leading up to its passage.26 It contains
numerous provisions, of which sections 78B-3-402 (“Findings”) and
78B-3-421 (“Arbitration Provisions” or “Section 421”) are most
relevant to this Comment.
1. Findings: The legislative purposes of the Utah Health Care
Malpractice Act
The findings and purposes behind the UHCMA can be broken
into three parts. First, the legislature found that the growing number
of claims and amount of awards had increased the cost of malpractice
insurance, which had in turn increased health care costs by forcing
physicians to practice defensive medicine and to pass the costs of
increased premiums on to patients. Second, the legislature found
that protecting the public interest required measures “designed to
encourage private insurance companies to continue to provide
health-related malpractice insurance.”27 Finally, the legislature stated
that its purpose was to “provide a reasonable time in which actions
may be commenced against health care providers while limiting that
time to a specific period for which professional liability insurance
premiums can be reasonably and accurately calculated; and to
provide other procedural changes to expedite early evaluation and
settlement of claims.”28
These legislative findings and purposes are important for a
number of reasons. Perhaps the most important is that they
demonstrate a clear legislative pronouncement of the policy
considerations that the Utah legislature has chosen to favor. This will
become important in the discussion below, as both the preemption
26. Id. § 78B-3-402(1).
27. Id. § 78B-3-402(2).
28. Id. § 78B-3-402(3). This subsection presumably references UTAH CODE ANN. §
78B-3-404, which sets the statute of limitations for a health care malpractice claim.
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and reverse preemption analysis calls for some inquiry into legislative
purpose.29
2. Arbitration Provisions: Requirements for enforceable arbitration
agreements under the UHCMA
A physician that employs a pre-dispute arbitration agreement in
compliance with section 421 must inform a patient, in writing, of the
procedural requirements and substantive rights under the
agreement.30 The agreement requires that a panel of three arbitrators
hear any dispute.31 In a dispute, one arbitrator is chosen: (1)
collectively by all persons claiming damages, (2) by the health care
provider, and (3) jointly by the health care provider and all persons
claiming damages.32 If the parties cannot agree as to the third
arbitrator, the other two arbitrators jointly select the third from a list
of approved arbitrators in Utah’s state and federal courts.33 The
statute also provides that a single arbitrator may hear the dispute, if
all parties agree.34 The health care provider must also inform the
patient of his or her responsibility for any “arbitration-related costs
under the agreement.”35 The agreement has a one-year term and will
be automatically renewed each year unless either party cancels it in
writing.36
Section 421 also grants the patient a number of rights that must
be included in any enforceable agreement. For example, the
agreement must give the patient the right to rescind it within ten
days of signing.37 The patient also has the right to retain legal
counsel and to make other procedural requests, including mandatory
mediation.38 Further, the health care provider must verbally
encourage the patient to read the information required under the

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

1876

See infra Part IV.
See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-421(1)(a).
Id. § 78B-3-421(1)(b)(i).
Id. §§ 78B-3-421(1)(b)(i)(A)–(C).
Id. § 78B-3-421(1)(b)(i)(C).
Id. § 78B-3-421(1)(b)(ii).
Id. § 78B-3-421(1)(a)(iii).
Id. § 78B-3-421(1)(b)(v).
Id. § 78B-3-421(1)(b)(iv).
Id. §§ 78B-3-421(1)(b)(vi), (2)(b)(i).
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statute and ask any questions the patient might have about his or her
rights under the agreement.39
Finally, the health care provider may not deny health care to a
patient solely because he or she refuses to be bound by an arbitration
agreement.40 This last provision is probably the most important in
the overall preemption analysis. It represents a series of amendments
and policy decisions made by lawmakers in response to health care
lobbyists and patients’ rights groups. In 2003, the Utah legislature
amended the original UHCMA to give health care providers the
right to deny non-emergency care to anyone who refused to sign an
arbitration agreement.41 This amendment sparked immediate public
outcry, which was exacerbated after Intermountain Health Care—
Utah’s largest health care provider—put mandatory arbitration into
effect.42 The issue was revisited a year later, and “after months of
political posturing by health care providers, patients, lawyers, and
politicians,” the Arbitration Provisions were revised to their current
form.43 This was seen as a “compromise,” with providers giving up
mandatory arbitration, but no longer being required to inform
patients of their rights by verbal explanation, and requiring that
doctors give patients only ten days to rescind the agreement, rather
than thirty.44 These policy choices by lawmakers play an important
role in subsequent cases interpreting section 421 and also will factor
into the preemption dilemma discussed in later parts of this
Comment.
3. Retroactivity of Section 421 and Soriano v. Graul
Soriano v. Graul45 is one of the few reported cases in which Utah
appellate courts have interpreted the language and scope of section
421. This case, by deciding the question of section 421’s

39. Id. § 78B-3-421(1)(c).
40. Id. § 78B-3-421(3).
41. Medical Malpractice Amendments, 2003 Utah Laws 925; see Brian P. Rosander,
Medical Arbitration in Utah: A Plea for Greater Fairness and Equal Bargaining Positions, 2005
UTAH L. REV. 969, 974–75.
42. Rosander, supra note 41, at 976.
43. Id. at 976–77.
44. Id. at 977.
45. 186 P.3d 960 (Utah Ct. App. 2008).
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retroactivity, gives some insight into the various policy concerns
surrounding health care arbitration. In Soriano, the Utah Court of
Appeals held that an arbitration agreement was unenforceable where
its provisions did not reflect certain requirements passed by the Act’s
2004 amendment.46 The patient and doctor in that case had entered
into the agreement before the 2004 amendments were signed.47 The
doctor argued that because the statute did not expressly use the term
“retroactive,” the additional requirements did not apply and the
agreement should be enforced.48 The court rejected this argument
and held that the underlying statute’s clear statement that it applies
to agreements made “after May 2, 1999” demonstrated clear
legislative intent to apply any future amendments retroactively to
that date.49 The court further buttressed this reasoning with a
number of exchanges between then Representative Steve Urquhart
and other legislators during the floor debates on the 2004
amendments.50 When asked about retroactivity, Representative
Urquhart first stated that he did not know whether the amendments
would apply retroactively, but after further questioning, he claimed
that they would.51
The court did acknowledge two potential weaknesses in its
reasoning: namely, that the 2002 amendments of section 421 also
contained the “after May 2, 1999” language, and that
Representative
Urquhart’s
responses
were
inconsistent.52
Nevertheless, the court concluded that the underlying statute’s
language and Representative Urquhart’s statements, taken together,
made up the requisite legislative intent to apply the amendment
retroactively, notwithstanding the legislature’s failure to use the term

46. Id. at 964. As discussed above, the language of the 2003 version of § 421 reserved
patients the right to refuse arbitration agreements and still receive treatment only in the
“emergency department of a general acute hospital.” See Medical Dispute Resolution
Amendments, 2004 Utah Laws 318 (omitting restrictive language).
47. Soriano, 186 P.3d at 961.
48. Id. at 962.
49. Id. (emphasis omitted).
50. Id. at 963–64.
51. Id. at 963.
52. See id. at 962–63 n.1, 963–64.

1878

DO NOT DELETE

1869

2/1/2011 5:31 PM

Between a Rock and a Hard Place

“retroactive”53 and the general rule that no statute is retroactive
“unless expressly so declared.”54
In so holding, the court did not utterly fail to address the
potential logistical problems that retroactivity would raise, but it was
unsympathetic towards physicians who would face those problems.
The doctor had argued that retroactivity would be a hardship to
practitioners “who see patients only one or two times and have few
occasions to renew [or revise] their agreements.”55 The court
responded that “physicians were not precluded from contacting
patients” for the purpose of entering into new agreements.56
In addition, the court paid special attention to the policy
surrounding the 2004 amendments. The specific provision at issue in
Soriano required that the patient be informed that “he or she ‘may
not be denied health care on the sole basis that the patient . . .
refused to enter into a binding arbitration agreement with a health
care provider.’”57 The court pointed out that the amendment was
passed as “a response to the public outcry requesting that the status
of medical arbitration be changed from mandatory to voluntary.”58
Soriano is an important demonstration of the Utah Court of
Appeals’s conceptualization of arbitration. On the one hand, the
entire UHCMA was apparently enacted for the purpose of lowering
health care liability costs. On the other hand, the 2004 amendments
implicated important patients’ rights. The court’s decision upheld
patients’ rights notwithstanding shaky evidence of legislative intent
for retroactivity and a general presumption against it. Hence, by
upholding patient’s rights in the face of increased cost to physicians,
Soriano illustrates how the UHCMA has stepped into the shoes of
unconscionability and other contract defense doctrines. Soriano also
shows the inherent tension within the UHCMA itself as the statute
53. Id. at 962.
54. Id. (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 68-3-3 (2004)). The language of the statute has
changed since Soriano was decided. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 68-3-3 (Supp. 2010) (“A
provision of the Utah Code is not retroactive, unless the provision is expressly declared to be
retroactive.”).
55. Soriano, 186 P.3d at 964 n.3.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 964 (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-14-17(3) (Supp. 2007), which has
since been renumbered as § 78B-3-421(3)) (omission in original).
58. Id. at 961.
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attempts to reconcile patient fairness with a pro-physician tort reform
agenda. This conceptual dissonance is characteristic of many state
arbitration statutes and will become very important in the MFA
reverse preemption discussion below.59
C. Statutory Provisions Outside Utah
While an exhaustive survey of state law in this area is beyond the
scope of this Comment, it is important to note some key similarities
between the Utah statute and others. Many of these statutes, like the
UHCMA, have apparently attempted to protect patients’ interests by
inserting provisions meant to impose certain enforceability
requirements on arbitration agreements. This may be problematic
under the FAA, which protects the enforceability of arbitration
agreements and will invalidate a conflicting state statute that singles
out arbitration agreements for special restrictions on enforceability.60
Thus, this subsection is meant to help place the UHCMA and
various other state statutes on a spectrum according to the degree to
which they restrict the enforceability of arbitration agreements. This
will serve as the basis for the preemption discussion in Part III
below.
While statutory approaches to arbitration vary widely among
states, many states, like Utah, initially adopted mandatory arbitration
in order to streamline the litigation process and decrease expenses.61
Thereafter, most amended their provisions to make arbitration
voluntary.62 Some state provisions appear to apply both to voluntary,

59. See infra Part IV.C. For the purposes of this subsection, however, the resulting takehome lesson for legislators seeking to respond to constituents’ concerns over mandatory
arbitration is to be mindful of the practical implications of a proposed statute. Even something
as seemingly benign as retroactivity may have important ramifications for parties seeking to
enforce their agreement. This is especially true for physicians that use a standard agreement
and either treat a high volume of patients or see patients only once or twice for a specialized
procedure.
60. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984).
61. See Florence Yee, Note, Mandatory Mediation: The Extra Dose Needed to Cure the
Malpractice Crisis, 7 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 393, 409–11 (2006) (discussing the “rise
and fall” of mandatory arbitration statutes).
62. Id. at 410. See also NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE TORT LAWS (2004), available at http://www.ncsl.org/print/
standcomm/sclaw/tortchart04.pdf. As of 2004, Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, California,
Colorado, Georgia, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, New Jersey,
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pre-dispute arbitration agreements and to those agreements reached
after the patient’s claim arises.63 Other provisions apparently apply
only to one or the other. Recall the provision in Utah’s section 421
mandating that a physician shall not deny medical services to a
patient refusing to enter into an arbitration agreement.64 Other states
employ similar requirements. For example, the Alaska statute reads,
“[e]xecution of an agreement under this subsection by a patient may
not be made a prerequisite to receipt of care or treatment by the
health care provider.”65 Ohio, South Dakota, and Colorado’s
statutes contain very similar language.66 Such provisions make sense
only if physicians are seeking to bind patients to an arbitration
agreement before treating the patient.67 Vermont and North
Carolina’s statutes take an even more direct approach. Although
both the North Carolina and Vermont statutes allow for voluntary
arbitration agreements after the patient’s claim arises, they apparently
forbid any pre-dispute agreement.68
New York, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, and
Virginia all had voluntary arbitration provisions of one form or another.
63. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
TORT LAWS (2004), available at http://www.ncsl.org/print/standcomm/sclaw/
tortchart04.pdf.
64. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-421(3) (2008).
65. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.535(a) (2008).
66. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-64-403(7) (West 2005); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2711.23(A) (LexisNexis 2008); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-25B-3 (2004).
67. Often state statutes will simply fail to declare explicitly whether the statute’s
requirements apply to both pre-dispute arbitration agreements and those entered into after the
claim arises. Thus, the reader is left to infer whether a given provision would apply based on
the statutory language. For example, the Alabama statute reads, “After a physician, dentist,
medical institution, or other health care provider has rendered services, or failed to render
services, to a patient out of which a claim has arisen, the parties thereto may agree to settle
such dispute by arbitration.” ALA. CODE § 6-5-485(a) (LexisNexis 2005) (emphasis added).
Thus, the statute apparently applies only to arbitration agreements signed once the claim arises.
Other state statutes are similarly vague. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-421 (making no
explicit mention of whether the statute applies equally to all agreements to arbitrate). But see
ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.535 (providing that the section applies to both pre-dispute and postclaim arbitration agreements). Ultimately, however, whether or not a statute allows for predispute agreements only makes a difference if the provision restricts the enforceability of an
otherwise valid arbitration agreement. Such restrictions may run afoul the FAA, which will
invalidate state laws that single out arbitration agreements for special, restrictive treatment. See
infra Part III.B.
68. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.60 (2009) (“[A]ny contract provision or other agreement
entered into prior to the commencement of an action that purports to require a party to elect
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Many state statutes provide for patient cancellation of the
arbitration agreement within a certain time. Many also include an
expiration term. Among the statutes that include these terms, almost
no two are alike.69 Utah gives the patient ten days to decide whether
to rescind the agreement.70 By contrast, Illinois allows the patient to
cancel the agreement within sixty days of signing it, or within sixty
days of the patient’s discharge from the hospital, whichever is later.71
Although Utah’s section 421 provides for automatic renewal of the
arbitration agreement from year to year,72 Illinois law invalidates an
arbitration agreement after two years.73 Ohio’s provision takes the
rescission question in a different direction entirely: if a patient files a
claim within thirty days of signing the agreement, that filing is
deemed a withdrawal from the agreement.74
Utah’s section 421 differs from several statutes because it does
not contain any formal type-set requirement or special visual warning
for the patient on the face of the agreement itself.75 Conversely,
California’s statute requires a special notice to appear “[i]mmediately
before the signature line” of the contract.76 It must read:

arbitration under this Article is void and unenforceable.”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 7002(a)
(2002) (“After discovery of an alleged injury, persons asserting a claim based on medical
malpractice may submit the claim in writing to arbitration prior to the commencement of any
trial as to said claim, but not thereafter, providing that all parties having an interest in the claim
agree to arbitration. A patient may not be requested to enter into such an agreement to arbitrate
until after the patient is aware of the nature and the existence of the claim.” (emphasis added)).
69. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.55.535(c), (e) (providing thirty days for patients to
cancel and requiring re-execution of a new agreement every time the patient is admitted to the
hospital); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1295 (West 2007) (allowing thirty days from the date of
signature for rescission); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-64-403(4) (giving patient ninety days
to rescind); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4231 (2009) (providing, in advisory language, that the
agreement should expire after five years and allowing the parties themselves to fill in the date of
effectiveness of the agreement); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 4406-a-2 to -4 (McKinney 2002)
(requiring that HMO enrollees be given notice that they may cancel their arbitration
agreement without mentioning a specific time frame); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-25B-1
(2004) (providing that parties may terminate a valid arbitration agreement as to future services
by giving written notice to all the parties at any time).
70. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-421(1)(b)(iv) (2008).
71. 710 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 15/9(c) (West 2007).
72. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-421(1)(b)(v).
73. 710 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 15/9(c).
74. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.23(I) (LexisNexis 2008).
75. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-421.
76. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1295(b) (West 2007).
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“NOTICE: BY SIGNING THIS CONTRACT YOU ARE
AGREEING TO HAVE ANY ISSUE OF MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE DECIDED BY NEUTRAL ARBITRATION
AND YOU ARE GIVING UP YOUR RIGHT TO A JURY
OR COURT TRIAL. SEE ARTICLE 1 OF THIS
CONTRACT.”77

The notice must be set off from the rest of the text and appear “in at
least 10-point bold red type.”78
Other state statutes require the special notice to be even more
expansive. South Dakota and Colorado include language advising
the patient of his or her right to receive medical services regardless of
the patient’s decision whether to sign the contract.79 New York
requires explanation and notice of arbitration in bold-face type if the
arbitration agreement is between a health maintenance organization
(HMO) and its enrollees.80
Another common statutory feature, closely related to formal
type-setting requirements, is requiring that an arbitration agreement
contain a basic outline of the arbitration procedures.81 For example,
the Michigan statute, in addition to requiring that patients be
informed that an arbitration agreement constitutes a waiver of the
right to trial and appeal, requires that the agreement contain “[a]
process for the selection of an arbitrator.”82 Selection of the
arbitrator is another mechanism that varies widely between states,
but most statutes contain some combination of arbitrator selection
by the patient and the doctor.83 If states, like Utah, allow both the

77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-25B-3 (2004); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-64403(4) (West 2005).
80. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4406-a(2) (McKinney 2002).
81. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2912g(1) (West 2000).
82. Id.
83. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-485(b) (LexisNexis 2005) (requiring a three-arbitrator
panel with one arbitrator chosen by the claimant, one by the defendant, and one chosen by the
parties’ selected arbitrators); ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.535(f) (2008) (providing for a panel of
three arbitrators: one designated by claimants, one by the health care provider, and one by
mutual agreement); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.207(4) (West 2005) (providing for an arbitration
panel consisting of one arbitrator selected by the claimant, one arbitrator selected by the
defendant, and one administrative law judge from the Division of Administrative Hearings who
serves as the chief arbitrator); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.23(F) (LexisNexis 2008)
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patient and the doctor to choose arbitrators, they will generally have
some mechanism for overcoming deadlock on the tie-breaking
arbitrator.84
Some state statutes contain provisions that have little in common
with other statutes, but which are nonetheless important in the
preemption analysis. For example, Louisiana’s law is unique in
providing an advisory form for physicians to use in drafting
arbitration agreements.85 The Louisiana statute makes clear,
however, that the form is “merely a sample” and that the form’s
provisions are “not required as a matter of law.”86
As the foregoing state statutes demonstrate, different states have
enacted widely varying provisions restricting the enforceability of
arbitration agreements. Some provisions appear to restrict
enforceability to a greater degree than others. Some provisions seem
to strike at the heart of the parties’ substantive rights (e.g., whether a
physician can refuse to treat a patient who refuses to sign), while
others affect only the arbitration proceedings themselves. Whether
and to what degree a statute restricts the enforceability of arbitration
agreements and, to a lesser extent, whether the restrictions are
“substantive” or “procedural,”87 plays an important role in
determining whether a statute that conflicts with the FAA will avoid
preemption.
III. THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT
Although arbitration enjoys a favored status in American law,
such status came about only as a result of purposeful legislative
efforts. On the federal level, such efforts culminated in the FAA,
which Congress passed to reverse the historical judicial hostility
toward arbitration agreements in English and American common law
(requiring three arbitrators, with no more than one being a physician or a hospital
representative).
84. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-485(b) (providing that if the parties’ selected arbitrators
cannot select a third arbitrator within thirty days, the court will select one); ALASKA STAT. §
09.55.535(f) (“If the parties cannot agree on the third person, the court will provide a choice
of three or more persons who might serve as chairperson of the arbitration board, which shall
be from a list of qualified arbitrators furnished by the attorney general.”).
85. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4231 (2009).
86. Id.
87. See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S.
468, 476, 477 n.6 (1989).
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and “to place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other
contracts.”88 Subsequent case law has confirmed that Congress
intended the FAA to create a “national policy” in favor of
arbitration.89 Under the FAA, courts should resolve doubts in favor
of arbitration.90 This is true “whether the problem at hand is the
construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of
waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.”91 This Part begins by
summarizing the FAA’s basic provisions and the complex case law
surrounding the FAA. It then discusses the applicability of the FAA
to medical arbitration agreements and, assuming the FAA applies,
examines how preemption operates on a state statute like Utah’s
section 421. This discussion will examine whether the state
provisions should be preempted because they violate the “national
policy” by going too far in restricting health care providers’ right to
enforce arbitration agreements.92 This background will also help
highlight an important dilemma that presents major problems for
practitioners under the UHCMA and other similar statutory regimes.
A. Basic Provisions of the FAA
The FAA greatly enhances the enforceability of arbitration
agreements governed by it. Section 2 states, in pertinent part, that
“an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing

88. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 289 (2002) (quoting Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991)); see also Buckeye Check Cashing,
Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006) (“To overcome judicial resistance to arbitration,
Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).”).
89. Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 581 (2008) (“Congress enacted the
FAA to replace judicial indisposition to arbitration with a ‘national policy favoring [it] and
plac[ing] arbitration agreements on equal footing with all other contracts.’” (quoting Buckeye,
546 U.S. at 443) (alteration in original)).
90. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp, 460 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1983).
91. Id. at 25.
92. The idea that state statutory limitations on medical arbitration agreements could be
preempted under the FAA is not new. For example, Christine Melucci has identified a number
of statutory limitations on other types of arbitration agreements that are probably preempted
under recent Supreme Court precedent. Christine Melucci, Arbitration Agreements: When Does
the Federal Arbitration Act Preempt State Law?, 19 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 691, 695–96 (1996);
See also Thomas B. Metzloff, The Unrealized Potential of Malpractice Arbitration, 31 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 203, 212 (1996) (“Even the most restrictive statutes could be challenged now
relying on [FAA precedent].”).
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controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal,
shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”93
Thus, for contracts falling within the purview of the FAA, this
provision fulfills the underlying policy of the Act that “[c]ontracts to
arbitrate are not to be avoided by allowing one party to ignore the
contract and resort to the courts.”94 Such avoidance could lead to
protracted litigation, which is what the parties sought to avoid in the
first place by contracting for arbitration.95
Another factor contributing to the FAA’s important nationwide
impact on arbitration agreements is its far-reaching applicability—it
applies to any “contract evidencing a transaction involving
commerce.”96 Although the Act itself provides a specific definition of
those transactions “involving commerce,”97 subsequent cases have
construed that language very broadly.98 The Supreme Court has held
that “involving” is the functional equivalent of “affecting” and
“signals an intent to exercise Congress’ commerce power to the
93. 9 U.S.C § 2 (2006).
94. Southland Corp v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 7 (1984).
95. Id. Notwithstanding the broad scope of the FAA and its strong policy favoring the
enforceability of arbitration agreements, the Act also contains procedural safeguards allowing
courts to vacate arbitration awards in a narrow set of circumstances. For example, courts may
vacate arbitration awards in cases of misconduct by arbitrators or if the award was otherwise
“procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.” 9 U.S.C. § 10. It also provides other
grounds for review including the following: where there is evidence of “material miscalculation
of figures” or “mistake in description of any person, thing, or property referred to in the
award”; where the arbitrators grant an award on matters not submitted to them; or where the
award “is imperfect in matter of form not affecting the merits of the controversy.” Id. at § 11.
Circuit courts were long split over whether parties could contract for expanded judicial review
beyond those reasons enumerated by statute. See Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576,
583 n.5 (2008). The Ninth and Tenth Circuits held that parties could not, while the First,
Third, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits reached the opposite conclusion. Id. Hall Street resolved the
split in favor of exclusivity. Id. at 585 (holding that sections 10 and 11 “respectively provide
the FAA’s exclusive grounds for expedited vacatur and modification”).
96. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
97. See id. § 1 (“‘[C]ommerce’, as herein defined, means commerce among the several
States or with foreign nations, or in any Territory of the United States or in the District of
Columbia, or between any such Territory and another, or between any such Territory and any
State or foreign nation, or between the District of Columbia and any State or Territory or
foreign nation, but nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of
seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce.”).
98. See, e.g., Snyder v. Smith, 736 F.2d 409, 417–18 (7th Cir. 1984), overruled on other
grounds by Felzen v. Andreas, 134 F.3d 873, 876–77 (7th Cir. 1998).
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full.”99 The Court later expanded this power even further by
concluding that the Commerce Clause power may be exercised in
individual cases “if in the aggregate the economic activity in question
would represent ‘a general practice . . . subject to federal
control.’”100
The broad standard of “involving commerce” has generally
prompted courts to apply the FAA to medical malpractice cases.101
For example, in Triad Health Management of Georgia, LLC v.
Johnson, the Georgia Court of Appeals held that the FAA applied to
an arbitration agreement where the patient’s representative signed it
upon the patient’s admission to a nursing home.102 The court
reasoned that although the facility was located in the state, the
parent company had additional offices in Maryland.103 Further, the
court reasoned that the in-state facility “purchased supplies from
out-of-state vendors, . . . treated out-of-state patients and had
patients insured through medicaid and medicare and private
insurance providers, and some of the private insurance claims were
handled in locations outside the state.”104 Given this broad
interpretation of “involving commerce,” the FAA would apply to
nearly all medical transactions.
B. Effect on State Law
The FAA creates a body of federal substantive law applicable in
both state and federal courts.105 Although the FAA itself does not
specifically address its relationship with conflicting state law, after a
string of litigation “[t]he FAA’s displacement of conflicting state law

99. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 277 (1995).
100. Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 57 (2003) (quoting Mandeville Island
Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 236 (1948)) (omission in original). For a
more expanded history of FAA interpretation under the Commerce Clause, as well as the
provisions of the Act itself, see Leasure & Ragan, supra note 6, at 52–56.
101. See, e.g., Triad Health Mgmt. of Ga., III, LLC v. Johnson, 679 S.E.2d 785, 787–88
(Ga. Ct. App. 2009).
102. Id. at 787.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 787–88.
105. See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 n.32
(1982); see also Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S.
468, 485 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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is ‘now well-established . . . .’”106 State and federal courts must
equally acknowledge the “national policy” favoring arbitration. This
policy serves to foreclose attempts by legislatures to undermine the
enforceability of arbitration agreements.107 Thus, although the FAA
ostensibly leaves states some room to draft their own arbitration
statutes,108 the FAA aims to ensure the enforceability of private
agreements to arbitrate according to their own terms.109 At times,
this requires that a court simply invalidate the state’s conflicting
provisions.110
The Supreme Court has also further clarified the types of state
law preempted by the FAA. For example, in Doctor’s Associates, Inc.
v. Casarotto,111 the Supreme Court reversed the Montana Supreme
Court and held that an arbitration agreement was enforceable even
though it failed to meet the notice requirements under a state
statute.112 The Montana law required that an arbitration clause be
“‘typed in underlined capital letters on the first page of the
contract.’”113 In upholding the statute, the Montana Supreme Court
did not focus on the actual language of § 2 of the FAA, but it had
determined that invalidating the arbitration agreement would not
undermine the underlying policy of the FAA.114 Regarding the
Montana statute, the Supreme Court held that the FAA preempted
the state statute and that courts may not “invalidate arbitration
106. Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 352 (2008) (quoting Allied-Bruce Terminex Cos.,
Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 272 (1995)).
107. Id.; see also Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984).
108. See infra Part IV.A.
109. See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. 489 U.S. at 476. Hence, in Southland Corporation v.
Keating, the Supreme Court rejected the proposition that the FAA created a procedural rule
applicable only in federal courts and held that “the ‘involving commerce’ requirement in § 2,
[should be viewed] not as an inexplicable limitation on the power of the federal courts, but as a
necessary qualification on a [state] statute intended to apply in state and federal courts.” 465
U.S. at 14–15. The court reasoned that confining the scope of the FAA to parties seeking to
enforce arbitration agreements in federal courts would frustrate Congress’s broad enactment in
light of the policies behind the FAA. Id. at 14. The Southland Court specifically mentioned
two of these policies: Congress’s intent to overcome the traditional judicial hostility toward
arbitration and the failure of state arbitration statutes to adequately protect a party’s right to
enforce arbitration agreements. Id.
110. See, e.g., Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 683 (1996).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114(4) (1995)).
114. Id. at 685.
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agreements under state laws applicable only to arbitration
provisions.”115 The Court reasoned that because the law conditioned
“enforceability of arbitration agreements on compliance with a
special notice requirement not applicable to contracts generally,” the
statute directly conflicted with § 2.116 The Court further reasoned
that such a requirement violated the FAA’s policy to put arbitration
agreements “‘upon the same footing as other contracts.’”117
Nevertheless, the underlying arbitration agreement must be valid
to be enforced under the FAA. In determining whether a party
agreed to arbitration, courts usually “should apply ordinary state-law
principles that govern the formation of contracts.”118 Thus, as one
court noted, the “trial court rather than the arbitrator decides
gateway matters, such as whether a valid arbitration agreement
exists.”119 Therefore, notwithstanding the ironclad policy
surrounding the enforceability of arbitration agreements under the
FAA, Sosa v. Paulos, discussed above, and similar state cases
demonstrate how contract defenses—including fraud, duress, and
unconscionability—may operate to invalidate an arbitration
agreement.120
C. The Role of the FAA in Current Medical Malpractice Arbitration
In attempting to draft cognizable guidelines for courts to use in
determining the enforceability of arbitration agreements, state
legislators have, in some cases, gone too far in imposing stringent
requirements for enforceability. As discussed above, the FAA
preempts these conflicting state laws.
1. Utah’s Section 421 and FAA preemption
Utah’s Medical Arbitration statute provides an excellent case
study of the potential anomalies and problems that arise when
115. Id. at 687 (emphasis in original).
116. Id.
117. Id. (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974)).
118. First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995).
119. Tex. Cityview Care Ctr., L.P. v. Fryer, 227 S.W.3d 345, 351 (Tex. App. 2007).
120. See Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) (“[G]enerally
applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress or unconscionability, may be applied to
invalidate arbitration agreements without contravening § 2 [of the FAA].”).
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considering whether a state arbitration statute conflicts with federal
law. On its face, section 421 acknowledges the preeminence of the
FAA. It reads in pertinent part that “[t]his section does not apply to
any arbitration agreement that is subject to the Federal Arbitration
Act.”121 However, given the pervasive scope of the FAA, it is difficult
to hypothesize an agreement between a patient and a health care
provider that would not fall within the purview of the FAA. Hence,
this provision apparently attempts to avoid preemption by alluding
to a small corner of the arbitration field where Utah’s UHCMA
applies but the FAA does not. As discussed above, such a corner
almost certainly does not exist.
The Utah Legislature foresaw this possibility when it passed
section 421 and its subsequent amendments. In an annotation to the
proposed 2004 amendment, which expressly stated that no health
care provider could refuse services to patients solely on the basis of
their failure to be bound to arbitration, the Utah Office of
Legislative Research and General Counsel (“The Office”) reviewed
the bill in light of the FAA.122 The Office noted that the language as
amended would mandate a relationship between the health care
provider and the patient. The Office pointed out that, under the
Supreme Court’s decision in Doctor’s Associates, cited above, states
may not single out arbitration for special, restrictive treatment.123
The Office concluded that “[i]f this bill was found to violate the
Federal Arbitration Act,” the language of section 421 “would
eliminate the intended effect of this bill.”124
The first part of the Office’s analysis appears correct, at least in
the abstract. In most typical contract negotiations, parties are free to
walk away from the proposed relationship or transaction if the terms
do not meet their satisfaction. Requiring a physician to enter into a
relationship with a patient even though the patient refused one of
the physician’s proposed terms (that parties would arbitrate any
dispute) singles out arbitration agreements as a suspect category,
placing them on different footing than other contracts.
However, the Office’s conclusion that the intended effect of the
bill would be eliminated only “[i]f this bill was found to violate the
121.
122.
123.
124.

1890

UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-421(7) (2008).
See S.B. 117, Gen. Sess. at 4 (Utah 2004); S.B. 245, Gen. Sess. (Utah 2004).
S.B. 117.
Id.

DO NOT DELETE

1869

2/1/2011 5:31 PM

Between a Rock and a Hard Place

Federal Arbitration Act” is confusing. On the plain language of the
statute, none of the enforceability requirements even apply to an
arbitration agreement that falls within the scope of the FAA. On the
other hand, the wide scope of the FAA would not leave courts room
to find that an arbitration agreement is not covered under the FAA
anyway. Perhaps the Utah Legislature merely glossed over this fact
when it passed the bill. Interestingly enough, the Office’s note was
not included in the 2004 bill that passed from the Senate to the
House and the sponsoring senator did not mention the possible
interaction between the FAA and what later became section 421 in
his statements on the Senate Floor.125 Thus, this provision in section
421 provides a cautionary tale to legislators drafting statutes similar
to the UHCMA in other states. Although the UHCMA anticipates
interaction with the FAA, it should be clearer in how it purports to
escape preemption, given the broad scope of the FAA in the health
care context.126 As it stands, the UHCMA is wide-open for federal
preemption, which, theoretically, leaves absolutely no room for its
strict enforceability requirements.
2. FAA and preemption of other state statutes
Utah’s UHCMA is not the only statute vulnerable to
preemption. Similar statutes in other states also require physicians to
treat patients regardless of whether the patient signs the arbitration
agreement. Hence, if the Utah statute is preempted on this ground,

125. See generally Floor Debate, 55th Utah Leg., Gen. Sess. (February 20, 23, 25, 2004)
(transcript on file with author), audio available at http://le.utah.gov/asp/audio/index.asp?.
Most of the debate instead centered on whether the bill should provide for a three-arbiter
panel or a single arbiter and the policy implications of both approaches. Id. However, the bill’s
sponsor, Senator Blackham, did note the public outcry over mandatory arbitration as a catalyst
for the provision requiring doctors to treat patients even though the patient refused to sign the
arbitration agreements. Senator Blackham called the provision “very unusual” and said, “as far
as I know it is the only area of practice or services where we actually deny that ability of a
provider to say that if you don’t agree, I cannot refuse you services.” Id. at 33–47.
126. It seems that the legislature chose to simply skirt the issue. However, it is unclear
whether legislators simply did not fully appreciate the import of the Office’s caution or
whether the state of the law really is unclear. Although it seems fairly clear that the UHCMA
violates the FAA, evolving case law and the specter of reverse preemption makes it less clearcut.
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surely the Alaska, Colorado, and Ohio statutes would be preempted
for this reason alone.127
Similarly, Utah does not have the most restrictive statutory
regime. Other statutes strike even closer at the FAA’s “national
policy” favoring arbitration. For example, Vermont’s and North
Carolina’s statutes, which seem to flatly invalidate pre-dispute
arbitration agreements, run directly contrary to the FAA’s basic tenet
that arbitration agreements are “valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable.”128 The Louisiana statute, on the other hand, probably
escapes preemption because, although it gives an actual form to
guide agreement drafters, and the form contains provisions for
heightened patient protection, the statute explicitly makes those
provisions advisory.129 Similarly, provisions that are less restrictive on
an agreement’s enforceability, such as those that merely set forth the
method for selecting the arbitrators,130 probably escape preemption
under the same analysis that would condemn the Vermont and
North Carolina provisions.
The continued validity of more restrictive statutes—such as those
requiring specific, bold-faced notices—presents the most shocking
example of FAA/state law dissonance. After all, in Doctor’s Associates,
the Supreme Court held a statute preempted for this very reason.131
Accordingly, the California, Colorado, South Dakota, and New York
statutes should have already gone the way of the Montana statute
reviewed in Doctor’s Associates. Why these statutes are still on the
books despite clear grounds for preemption is both a complex and
enigmatic question—the potential answers to which are discussed in
the next Part.
127. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.535 (2008); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-64-403 (West
2005) (discussed in the reverse preemption context below); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.23
(LexisNexis 2008).
128. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
129. The Louisiana statute is admirable on several levels. First, the statute expressly
incorporates the FAA’s mandate making arbitration contracts valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable once parties forge them. Nevertheless, the statute also makes clear that these
contracts must be voluntary on the part of the patient. Finally, the form provides a safe harbor
for physicians’ attorneys drafting these agreements, which is why many physicians’
representatives favor medical malpractice arbitration statutes in the first place. See LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 9:4231 (2009).
130. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-485(b) (LexisNexis 2005); ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.535(f);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.207(4) (West 2005); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.23(F).
131. 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996).
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IV. SHORTCOMINGS IN THE CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK
There are three main reasons for the current confusion in this
area of the law. First, Supreme Court case law, which draws a
distinction between substantive and procedural statutes, leaves
grounds for FAA preemption unclear. Second, because neither
patients nor practitioners have an incentive to invoke the stern
provisions of the FAA, there is no voice calling for preemption when
state statutes are challenged in state courts. Finally, courts have
recently begun to use the McCarran-Ferguson Act (“MFA”) to
“reverse preempt” the FAA and allow states to pass more stringent
standards for arbitration agreement enforceability in the health care
arbitration context. However, extending the MFA to health care
threatens to swallow the FAA by allowing reverse preemption in an
infinite range of arbitration contexts. Instead, Congress should
simply amend the FAA to allow states to continue acting as
laboratories132 to reach political equilibrium between doctors and
patients, without doing violence to the original scope of the MFA.
A. Substance v. Procedure: The Supreme Court Muddies the Water
As discussed in Part III, courts’ traditionally broad readings of
the FAA leave little room for states to impose requirements for
enforceable arbitration agreements. However, the Supreme Court
has made clear that preemption applies only to state substantive law
and that states have greater latitude to prescribe the procedural rules
governing arbitration.133 The Supreme Court attempted to explain
this substance/procedure distinction in Volt Information Sciences,
Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University.134 In
Volt, the Supreme Court affirmed a California court of appeals
decision and upheld a statute that allowed parties to stay an
arbitration proceeding pending related litigation between a party to
the arbitration agreement and a third party not bound by it.135 The

132. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
133. Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, 552 U.S. 576 (2008); Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs.
of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 485 (1989).
134. 489 U.S. 468.
135. Id. at 470–71.
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party seeking to compel arbitration argued that the California court’s
decision amounted to imposing involuntary waiver on that party and
denying the party its federally guaranteed ability to compel
arbitration. It also argued that the California court’s decision ran
afoul of the “national policy” to resolve cases that fall within the
FAA with a “healthy regard for the federal policy favoring
arbitration.”136
The Supreme Court rejected both arguments and held that the
FAA did not preempt the state procedural law.137 The court reasoned
that the FAA does not grant a right to compel arbitration at any
time; rather, “it confers only the right to obtain an order directing
that ‘arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in [the parties’]
agreement.”138 The Court further stated that there “is no federal
policy favoring arbitration under a certain set of procedural rules.”139
Where the parties agreed to arbitrate in accordance with California
law, a statute that merely specifies the rules under which the
arbitration would occur does not violate Congress’s purpose of
enforcing arbitration agreements under their own terms.140 In a
footnote, the majority drew a distinction between the “substantive”
provisions of the FAA, which are also applicable in state courts, and
sections 3 and 4, which set out a number of procedural requirements
that apply only to proceedings in federal courts.141
This substance/procedure distinction also played an important
role in the Supreme Court’s decision in Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v.
Casarotto,142 discussed above. In Doctor’s Associates, the Supreme
Court reversed the Montana Supreme Court after it upheld a state
statute requiring that an arbitration clause be prominently displayed
on the first page of the contract.143 To buttress its conclusion,
Montana Supreme Court had ostensibly relied on the Supreme
Court’s decision in Volt. In rejecting the Montana court’s decision,

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
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Id. at 475.
Id. at 474–76.
Id. at 474–75 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 4).
Id. at 476 (emphasis added).
Id. at 478–79.
See id. at 477 n.5.
517 U.S. 681 (1996).
Id. at 683.
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the Supreme Court reasoned that the state court had misread Volt.144
Because the statute in question in Volt affected only the efficient
order of proceedings, rather than the enforceability of the agreement
itself, the statute did not undermine the policy of the FAA. By
contrast, the Montana statute was “antithetical” to those policies
because it specifically limited the enforceability of the underlying
agreement, rather than how the arbitration would proceed.145
This substance/procedure distinction articulated in Doctor’s
Associates remains a mystery in many respects. Subsequent decisions
have provided little insight into the kinds of matters that may be
contracted within the framework of the FAA.146 In addition, the
distinction between substance and procedure may be wholly
academic and redundant anyway. Consider, for example, a state law
provision that determines how arbitrators are chosen. As discussed in
the preceding part, that provision may escape preemption because it
does not restrict the enforceability of an arbitration agreement in
contravention of § 2 of the FAA. This is also the type of statute that
seems paradigmatically procedural and may be easily cabined
accordingly. Next consider, however, a provision governing forum
selection clauses in arbitration agreements. At the outset, mandating
that a given clause be included in an agreement definitely seems to
interfere with the agreement’s enforceability. On the other hand,
states should be able to determine where and how arbitration will
occur, in an effort merely to affect the “efficient order of
proceedings.” In such a case, a court will likely look to the basic
policy behind the FAA to determine whether such a provision affects
substantive rights—applying a substantially similar analysis as they
would have under § 2 of the FAA anyway.147 As a result, statutes that
144. Id. at 688.
145. Id.
146. But see Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, 552 U.S. 576, 586 (2008) (mentioning, in dicta,
that “many features of arbitration [may be chosen] by contract, including the way arbitrators
are chosen, what their qualifications should be, which issues are arbitrable, along with
procedure and choice of substantive law”).
147. See, e.g., Manson v. Dain Bosworth, Inc., 623 N.W.2d 610 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998).
In Manson, the Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld a statutory personal service requirement
on the grounds that it was procedural rather than substantive. The court reasoned that the
Supreme Court’s decision in Volt makes it clear that there is no federal policy to arbitrate
under a certain set of procedural rules. Id. at 615 (citations omitted). The court cited a
number of state cases reaching the same result. Id. Ultimately, the court concluded that “[t]he
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are toward the less restrictive end of the spectrum will tend to be
those procedural in nature, making the substance/procedure
distinction unnecessary. Those more toward the middle, not clearly
substantive or procedural, will be subject to much the same analysis
as they would under § 2.
At the very least, the substance/procedure distinction does
nothing to further the interests of either doctors or patients. Any
meaningful provisions that would affect the balance of power
between the parties would likely either restrict or remove restrictions
to the enforceability of arbitration agreements. Accordingly,
litigation will almost always require a § 2 analysis.148 The practical
result is that state statutes that are vulnerable to preemption will
likely remain on the books due to judges, practitioners, and
legislators continuing to struggle in an unnecessary haze until
Congress or the Supreme Court hands down clear guidance on the
substance/procedure issue.
B. No Voice for Preemption
Another factor that allows vulnerable statutes to remain on the
books deals with practical litigation incentives. The traditional, ad
hoc judicial approach to determining whether the FAA will preempt
a state statute is insufficient in the health care arbitration context due
to a glaring Catch-22149 that faces practitioners in this area. As the
key issue in determining whether the FAA preempts a substantive state law is whether the state
law is an obstacle to the purposes and objectives of the FAA.” Id. (emphasis added). The court
further noted that the Supreme Court’s decision in Doctor’s Associates stands for the
proposition that state laws that have been held to be preempted by the FAA are laws that
undermine the private arbitration process by making it difficult to enforce the underlying
agreement. Id. at 616 (citations omitted); see also Keystone, Inc. v. Triad Sys. Corp., 971 P.2d
1240 (Mont. 1998) (distinguishing a statute that invalidated choice of forum provisions in
contracts generally from Casarotto and reasoning that just because the statute in Keystone limits
part of the enforceability of the agreement, it does not follow that it conflicts with the policy of
the FAA). But see Allen v. World Inspection Network Int’l, Inc., 911 A.2d 484 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. 2006) (holding that the FAA preempts state law invalidating the forum-election
clause unless enforcement would be contrary to general principles of contract law).
148. Proponents of the substance/procedure distinction would counter this argument by
maintaining that once a provision is deemed “procedural” that is the end of the analysis, there
is no vast spectrum—or at least that provision is no longer plotted on it. Such a view is overly
formalistic because any issue worth litigating will probably implicate important rights that a
court engaged in arbitrary line drawing could construe as either substantive or procedural.
149. This problem represents a Catch-22 in the most fundamental sense. The term
“Catch-22” originates from Joseph Heller’s book of the same name, first published in 1961. It
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policy and history surrounding the UHCMA’s Arbitration Provisions
clearly demonstrate, there is no voice advocating for FAA
preemption. Obviously, a patient facing a motion to compel
arbitration under the Utah law would never argue for preemption
because, as discussed above, section 421 probably already contains
greater patient safeguards than the FAA allows. However, a doctor
seeking to compel arbitration for an agreement not in compliance
with section 421 will quickly find that arguing for preemption is
counterproductive. If section 421 is meant to be a statutory safeharbor for physicians’ arbitration agreements, representing a huge
amount of work and lobbying resources by the health care industry,
the last thing that a doctor would want is to have the statute
invalidated. The vacuum created by preemption would subject
providers to the unpredictability of the unconscionability, or some
other judicially created, doctrine.150 The resulting increase in
litigation cost is exactly what the legislature sought to avoid by
enacting section 421.

has come to mean, in everyday usage, a dilemma or no-win situation of any type. The true
meaning from the book, however, is more subtle. In the book, Catch-22 is a bureaucratic
military rule that typifies the self-contradictory, circular logic that was the subject of Heller’s
satirical critique. Through the course of the book, Heller evokes provisions of Catch-22 to
illustrate different incarnations of these logical quandaries. At one point, the protagonist, a B25 bombadier, examines how Catch-22 could prevent a pilot from avoiding combat missions.
Catch-22 specified that concern for safety in the face of real and immediate danger was the
process of a rational mind. If a pilot was crazy, he could be grounded; but as soon as he asked
to be excused, he was no longer crazy and had to fly more missions. Hence, if he flew missions,
he was crazy and did not have to; but if he did not want to he was sane and had to. JOSEPH
HELLER, CATCH-22, at 52 (Simon & Schuster Classics 1999) (1961).
150. One author recently suggested that the FAA and the result in Casarotto has sparked
renewed interest in unconscionability doctrine. See Sandra F. Gavin, Unconscionability Found:
A Look at Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration Agreements 10 Years after Doctor’s Associates,
Inc. v. Casarotto, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 249 (2006). Gavin argues that “[t]he Supreme Court’s
utilization of the FAA over the past few decades as the vehicle for overcoming hostility toward
the arbitration process may have generated the backlash taking place in state courts today.” Id.
at 270. Gavin embraces the use of unconscionability doctrine, which she characterizes as
flexible and well suited for policing fairness. Id. However, she declines to take a position on
whether courts are “inappropriately stretching the unconscionability defense.” Id. at 271.
Further, she recognizes that common law courts traditionally leave fairness of an agreement to
the bargain of the contracting parties and that “the definition of unconscionability remains
sketchy and elusive.” Id. at 262 (quoting Susan A. Fitzgibbon, Teaching Important Contracts
Concepts: Teaching Unconscionability through Agreements to Arbitrate Employment Claims, 44
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1401, 1405 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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The practical result is that only practitioners representing doctors
whose agreements do not conform to section 421 would ever argue
for preemption. Such a scenario would likely arise only where
attorneys representing a given physician either do not fully
understand section 421, or are simply careless in drafting the
agreement. This will be unlikely in the future given that both health
care providers and attorneys representing them have dedicated
significant resources to complying with the state law, and by now,
most, if not all, physicians who use these agreements have probably
achieved compliance. In this case, too, the consequences of winning
on the preemption argument are worse than losing because of the
likelihood of increased future costs. Hence, this Catch-22 will likely
cause the preemption question to go unanswered because it would
require doctors to argue against their own safe harbor. The practical
result is that even the state law provisions on the most restrictive end
of the spectrum will go unchallenged. Thus, because appellate review
is unlikely, ad hoc judicial action will only maintain the status quo:
confusion and inconsistent results.
Some might argue that the problem is not the FAA, but the state
legislatures that seek to blend arbitration enforcement with politically
popular patients’ rights. This Comment does not advance the
legislative approaches, embodied by the UHCMA and similarlycrafted statutes from other states, as a perfect solution. Rather, it
points to Utah’s legislative experience as a viable instance of a state
reaching a well-wrought political compromise and passing
commensurate legislation. Although this might cut against the policy
underlying the FAA on its face, it does no more violence to the
enforceability of arbitration than ad hoc judicial determinations
based on common-law contract defenses. At the very least, giving a
green light to state statutes will help rectify the FAA confusion in
this area, provide a safe harbor for physicians’ arbitration agreements,
and provide patients greater predictability than the common law
alternatives. Frankly, federal law has little to lose because, without a
voice to argue for preemption, the FAA is already failing to further
the “national policy” in favor of arbitration.151
151. Other voices in the FAA debate urge that the FAA is inadequate for a different
reason—that courts have extended the FAA too far in general. According to some, the
“national policy” favoring arbitration has turned into judicial hostility to state legislative
attempts to protect unsophisticated parties. Such a viewpoint is embodied in vivid language by
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C. McCarran-Ferguson Act: An Answer to the Preemption Problem?
As preceding parts demonstrate, many questions remain as to
which statutes should be preempted by the FAA. Further
complicating matters, state courts have recently begun to add the
McCarran-Ferguson Act (“MFA”) into the FAA preemption puzzle
by using the MFA to “reverse preempt” the FAA, arguing that the
MFA places their state statutes beyond the reach of FAA preemption.
This subsection begins with a brief history of the MFA, an overview
of its key provisions, and a review of two state court cases applying
the MFA to health care arbitration statutes. It then critiques the
courts’ use of the MFA in this context before highlighting why the
MFA is a poor conceptual fit when applied by state courts to avoid
FAA preemption of health care arbitration statutes.

Justice Trieweiler of the Montana Supreme Court. In special concurrence of a case where FAA
preemption was at issue, Justice Trieweiler wrote:
In Montana, we are reasonably civilized and have a sophisticated system of justice
which has evolved over time and which we continue to develop for the primary
purpose of assuring fairness to those people who are subject to its authority.
....
We have contract laws and tort laws. We have laws to protect our citizens from bad
faith, fraud, unfair business practices, and oppression by the many large national
corporations who control many aspects of their lives but with whom they have no
bargaining power.
....
These insidious erosions of state authority and the judicial process threaten to
undermine the rule of law as we know it.
Nothing in our jurisprudence appears more intellectually detached from reality and
arrogant than the lament of federal judges who see this system of imposed
arbitration as “therapy for their crowded dockets.” These decisions have perverted
the purpose of the FAA from one to accomplish judicial neutrality, to one of open
hostility to any legislative effort to assure that unsophisticated parties to contracts of
adhesion at least understand the rights they are giving up.
Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d 931, 939–41 (Mont. 1994) (Trieweiler, J., concurring)
(emphasis added).
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1. History and basic provisions of the MFA
In 1869, the United States Supreme Court held that insurance
was not “commerce” and therefore was not subject to federal
Commerce Clause statutes.152 Later, in 1944, the Court reversed its
stance: whereas no other commercial enterprise conducting business
across state lines was completely beyond Congress’s Commerce
Clause authority, the Court refused to “make an exception of the
business of insurance.”153 A year later, Congress passed the MFA to
“alleviate the effect” of that decision on insurance companies.154 The
MFA states, in relevant part, that “[n]o Act of Congress shall be
construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any
State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance . . .
unless such Act specifically relates to the business of
insurance . . . .”155 Thus, by reversing the Supreme Court’s inroads
into state insurance regulation, Congress gave “‘support to the
existing and future state systems for regulating and taxing the
business of insurance.’”156
It is not entirely clear what constitutes the “business of
insurance”; however, the Supreme Court has suggested that the
following are included: fixing insurance rates; advertising and selling
policies; licensing insurance companies and agents; and determining
the types of policies issued.157 Although the outer limits remain
elusive, the Court has hinted that “other activities . . . [may] relate
so closely to [a company’s] status as [a] reliable insurer[]” that they
should be included in the “business of insurance.”158 Regardless of
152. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 183 (1869).
153. United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 553 (1944).
154. Freier v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 679 F.2d 780, 782 (9th Cir. 1982); see also SEC v.
Nat’l Secs., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 458 (1969) (discussing the history of the MFA).
155. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2006).
156. Nat’l Secs., Inc., 393 U.S. at 458 (quoting Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328
U.S. 408, 429 (1946)); see also U.S. Dep’t of Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491, 508 (1993).
Fabe clarified a statement from National Securities that the MFA attempted to “turn back the
clock” to the status quo prior to South-Eastern Underwriters. Id. Rather than inviting a
“detailed point-by-point comparison between the regime created by McCarran-Ferguson and
the one that existed before,” the language in National Securities regarding “turning back the
clock” referred specifically to restoring to the states their broad regulatory power in the
insurance industry. Id.
157. See Nat’l Secs., Inc., 393 U.S. at 460.
158. Id. (“Undoubtedly, other activities of insurance companies relate so closely to their
status as reliable insurers that they too must be placed in the same class.”).
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the exact limits of the MFA’s terms, however, it is clear that it
focuses on the insurance company’s relationship with the
policyholder. Hence, “[s]tatutes aimed at protecting or regulating
this relationship, directly or indirectly are laws regulating the
‘business of insurance.’”159
2. State courts and the specter of reverse preemption
State courts have recently begun to grapple with the question of
which laws regulate insurance for reverse preemption purposes in
health care arbitrations. For example, in In re Kepka,160 the Texas
Court of Appeals held it improper to compel arbitration where a wife
filed a wrongful death action after her husband died approximately
sixteen days after being admitted to a nursing home.161 At the time
he was admitted, the wife signed a number of documents, including
an arbitration agreement.162 The wife argued that the trial court
erred in compelling arbitration because the agreement did not
comply with state requirements.163 Specifically, the agreement did
not contain a certain, statutorily required phrase in ten-point, boldfaced type.164 The wife also argued that, although the agreement
expressly provided that the FAA should apply, the McCarranFerguson Act “‘reverse preempts’” the FAA, preventing it from
preempting the state law.165 The court agreed and held that the MFA
reverse preempts federal law when: “‘(1) the federal statute does not
specifically relate to the business of insurance, (2) the state law was
enacted for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance, and

159. Id. (citation omitted); see also Fabe, 508 U.S. at 501.
160. 178 S.W.3d 279 (Tex. App. 2005). In re Labatt Food Service, L.P., 279 S.W.3d 640,
647 (Tex. 2009), overruled In re Kepka’s holding that a non-signatory beneficiary could not
be bound by the decedent having signed an arbitration agreement. In re Labatt Food Service
did not address the issues of preemption and reverse preemption; therefore, In re Kepka
appears to remain good law on this point. Id. at 649.
161. Id. at 285.
162. Id. at 283.
163. Id. at 287.
164. Id. at 287–88.
165. Id. at 288.
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(3) the federal statute operates to invalidate, impair, or supersede the
state law.’”166
Looking to compel arbitration under the FAA, the Kepka
defendant had argued that the portion of the conflicting Texas act
covering arbitration should be examined separately from the rest of
the act. According to the defendant, the MFA did not save the
arbitration provisions from preemption because that portion of the
Texas act aimed to regulate the relationship between health care
providers and patients, rather than the relationship between the
insurer and the insured.167 Kepka acknowledged that there was some
precedent for such a reading.168 In U.S. Department of Treasury v.
Fabe, the U.S. Supreme Court suggested that courts should look to
discrete provisions in determining whether the MFA applied to state
statutes.169 As Kepka explained, Fabe held that under the MFA a
given state statute could be “enacted ‘for the purpose of regulating
the business of insurance’” “only ‘to the extent that’ the statute was
aimed at protecting or regulating the relationship between the
insurer and insured.”170 Hence, to the extent that the state sought to
regulate some other relationship, the MFA would not apply, and the
conflicting federal law would preempt the state law.171
Nevertheless, the court rejected the defendant’s argument—and,
implicitly, the guidance in Fabe concerning whether to examine state
statutes in whole or in part—and refused to “read [the Texas act] in
a vacuum for the purpose of determining whether it was enacted ‘for
166. Id. (quoting Bodine v. Webb, 992 S.W.2d 672, 677 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Although this standard has its roots in the actual language of 15
U.S.C. §1012(b), the practice of parsing that language into discrete elements did not originate
in the Texas appellate courts. Rather, Bodine cited to Munich American Reinsurance Co. v.
Crawford, a Fifth Circuit case arising in a different context than medical malpractice
arbitration. 141 F.3d 585 (5th Cir. 1998). Munich’s complicated facts boil down to a dispute
between two insurance companies (one of which was held in receivership by the state) over
whether monies paid out under an umbrella insurance policy constituted salvage to which the
other company was entitled under the contract. Id. at 587.
167. See Kepka, 178 S.W.3d at 289.
168. Id.
169. See U.S. Dep’t of Treasury v. Fabe, 507 U.S. 491, 508 (1993).
170. Kepka, 178 S.W.3d at 289 (quoting Fabe, 508 U.S. at 505, 508). Fabe declared,
“We hold that the Ohio priority statute, to the extent that it regulates policyholders, is a law
enacted for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance. To the extent that it is
designed to further the interests of other creditors, however, it is not a law enacted for the
purpose of regulating the business of insurance.” Fabe, 508 U.S. at 508.
171. See Kepka, 178 S.W.3d at 289.
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the purpose of regulating the business of insurance.’”172 Instead, the
court considered the statute “as a whole, rather than just the portion
of the act” that arguably conflicts with federal law.173 The court cited
twelve specific “findings and purposes” given by the Texas
Legislature in the act to buttress its conclusion that the purpose of
the entire statute was to decrease the cost of health care liability
claims through modifying the insurance system.174 The court also
noted that the act’s stated purpose was to “improve and modify the
system by which health care liability claims are determined.”175 Thus,
according to the Kepka court, because the entire Texas act aimed to
indirectly regulate the cost of malpractice insurance through
doctor/patient arbitration, the act triggered the MFA, reverse
preempting the FAA’s preemption of the Texas act.176 The practical
result was that the defendant’s motion to compel arbitration under
the FAA was defeated.
Another state case that provides an important comparison to
Kepka in the reverse preemption discussion is Allen v. Pacheco.177 In
Allen, the Colorado Supreme Court refused to compel arbitration on
facts similar to those in Kepka.178 The state statute at question in
Allen specifically mandated that health care arbitration be voluntary
by stating that no insurer could require a health care provider to use
arbitration agreements as a condition to providing medical
malpractice insurance.179 The court concluded that the state’s
arbitration agreement requirements were enacted for the purpose of
regulating the business of insurance because they “not only directly
regulate[d] contracts between health insurance policyholders and
172. Id.
173. Id. Other than citing two circuit court cases, the court provided no rationale
justifying this approach in light of Fabe. Id. (citing Munich Am. Reinsurance Co. v. Crawford,
141 F.3d 585, 590, 592 (5th Cir. 1998) and Stephens v. Am. Int’l Ins., 66 F.3d 41, 45 (2d
Cir. 1995)).
174. See id. at 289–91.
175. Id. at 290 (quoting Act of May 30, 1977, ch. 817, § 1.02, Tex. Gen. Laws 2039,
2039–41 (1977) (repealed 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
176. See id. at 291–92.
177. 71 P.3d 375 (Colo. 2003).
178. Id. at 377–78 (holding that a wife was not required to submit to arbitration in a
wrongful death suit brought on behalf of her deceased husband in part because the MFA
reverse preempted the FAA).
179. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-64-403(1) (West 2005).

1903

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2/1/2011 5:31 PM

2010

their insurers (in this case, HMOs), but also further[ed] the interests
of these policyholders.”180 The court reasoned that because HMOs
have largely replaced traditional health care insurers, a relationship
between the HMO medical service provider and the patient is a
relationship between an insurer and an insured.181 As such, even
though the Colorado statute applied to health care providers rather
than exclusively to insurers, the statute was enacted for the purpose
of regulating insurance. The court noted that “[a]s long as the
statute is not one of general applicability, it is not necessary that the
state statute relate only to insurance or that the statute be in the form
of an insurance code.”182 Thus, the Allen court went a step beyond
Kepka and seemed to conclude that, even if the entire statute was
not passed for the purpose of regulating insurance, a given statute
would trigger the MFA so long as at least some of its provisions
regulated the relationship between insurers and the insured.
3. How Kepka and Allen got it wrong
Dissenting from the Allen majority, Colorado Supreme Court
Justice Rebecca Kourlis provides a useful starting point in critiquing
180. Allen, 71 P.3d at 383 (footnote omitted).
181. Id. at 383 n.9.
182. Id. at 383 (emphasis added) (citing Mut. Reinsurance Bureau v. Great Plains Mut.
Ins. Co., 969 F.2d 931, 934 (10th Cir. 1992). However, Great Plains, like Munich American
Reinsurance Co. v. Crawford, 141 F.3d 585 (5th Cir. 1998), discussed above, see supra note
166, addressed the reverse preemption question in the context of reinsurance proceeds. See
Great Plains, 969 F.2d at 932–33. Other courts have reached a similar result in the HMO
context. See, e.g., Imbler v. PacifiCare of Cal., Inc., 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 715 (Cal. Ct. App.
2002); Smith v. PacifiCare Behavioral Health of Cal., Inc., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 140, 156–57
(Cal. Ct. App. 2001). Imbler came on the heels of In re Erickson v. Aetna Health Plans of
California, Inc., 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 76 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999), where the court had held that the
California statute at question in both Imbler and Erickson conflicted with the FAA. See In re
Erickson, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 78. However, Erickson did not address the MFA question. In
Imbler, a California court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of an HMO’s motion to
compel arbitration where the health care plan failed to make certain disclosures required by
state law. Imbler, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 723–24. The HMO argued that the state statute did
not apply because it was preempted by the FAA. See id. at 716. The court rejected the HMO’s
argument and held that the FAA did not preempt the statute because the MFA operated to
defeat preemption. Id. at 719. The court reasoned that the act, which regulated the actual
language and disclosure requirements in an HMO’s service plan, meant both that the HMO
was engaged in the “business of insurance” and that the act was passed for the purpose of
regulating the business of insurance. Id. at 721–23. Hence, although cited with approval in
Allen, the California statute in question in Smith and Imbler make those cases clearly
distinguishable from Allen. See Allen, 71 P.3d at 383 n.9.
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the MFA’s application in FAA preemption cases. Justice Kourlis
argued that the Colorado statute failed to meet both requirements
necessary to trigger the MFA: the law neither implicated the
“business of insurance” nor was it passed for that purpose.183 Rather
than regulating the insurance policy itself, the statute aimed to
control medical malpractice actions.184 Justice Kourlis further argued
that because the Colorado act applied “generally to medical service
providers and their patients, and not specifically to the relationship
between insurers and their insureds, it would be a law of general
application” and should not be subject to the MFA.185 Thus, Justice
Kourlis would have held that the Allen defendant could compel
arbitration under the FAA because the FAA preempted the Colorado
act.
Justice Kourlis next touched on a crucial point that may provide
the key to correctly following Fabe in the health care arbitration
context. According to Justice Kourlis, “it is the placement of the
arbitration clause limitation language . . . that must be the pivotal
factor . . . .”186 Justice Kourlis rightly points out that where a court
applies the MFA to a provision governing arbitration, the
legislature’s placement of the provision should manifest its intent to
regulate only certain arbitration agreements that impact insurance.187
Justice Kourlis believed that the Colorado act did not manifest such
intent; rather, it sought to contain and limit malpractice awards,
reduce malpractice insurance premiums, and stem the exodus of
doctors from the profession.188 Under Fabe, however, statutes aimed
at protecting or regulating the insurance relationship, whether direct
or indirect, regulate the business of insurance.189 Justice Kourlis
seems to have ignored this language in her critique of the Allen
majority’s decision to apply the MFA to the Colorado statute, even
though she acknowledges that the Colorado legislature passed at

183. See Allen, 71 P.3d at 384 (Kourlis, J., dissenting).
184. See id. at 387.
185. Id. at 387–88.
186. Id. at 388.
187. See id.
188. See id.
189. See U.S. Dep’t of Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491, 501 (1993) (citing SEC
v. Nat’l Secs., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 460 (1969)).
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least certain provisions within the act to (indirectly) reduce
malpractice insurance premiums.
As a result, Justice Kourlis ultimately misapplied Fabe by
concluding that because some provisions did not regulate the
relationship between insurers and insured, no provision in the statute
could trigger the MFA. However, Justice Kourlis’s mistake is no
more obvious than that of the Allen majority. Both opinions seemed
to acknowledge the Fabe decision by pointing to discrete provisions
that supported their conclusion that the Colorado act did (majority)
or did not (dissent) regulate the business of insurance. But rather
than applying the MFA only to that discrete provision, both opinions
used their conclusions regarding discrete provisions to decide
whether to apply the MFA to the entire statute. This is not entirely
faithful to Fabe, which instead commands that the MFA should apply
only to the extent that a statute regulates the relationship between
insurers and insured.190 The Allen majority and dissent may have
found some common ground had they identified provisions in the
statute that they felt were actually passed to regulate insurance
relationships, and then applied the MFA only to those parts.
Dissecting a given statute in this way is a crucial exercise for a
court determining whether a statute or provision should fall under
the MFA. Because Fabe would apply the MFA to statutes regulating
insurance relationships “directly or indirectly,”191 Fabe raises the
question to what degree a statute can indirectly regulate insurance
before it no longer falls within MFA protection. While this question
cries out for clarification, observers are left to hypothesize a host of
scenarios in which state legislatures and courts could eviscerate the
FAA or other preemption statutes by relating everything to insurance
premiums, regardless of remoteness. In her Allen dissent, Justice
Kourlis uses the example of state seat belt and helmet laws, arguing
that these laws could potentially relate indirectly to insurance
premiums under the Allen majority’s broad interpretation.192
Although this is not the best example, as such laws generally already
fall within the realm of the state’s plenary police power, it is easy to
see how state laws regulating everything from interstate drug

190. See id. at 508.
191. Id. at 501 (quoting Nat’l Secs., 393 U.S. at 460) (internal quotations omitted).
192. See Allen, 71 P.3d at 388 (Kourlis, J., dissenting).
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trafficking to long-haul freight limits can quickly relate back to
health and liability insurance. For example, assume that State X
decided to pass a law capping the length of long-haul tractor-trailers
entering the state.193 To support its policy, the legislature makes ten
or twelve findings of fact concerning the danger presented by trucks
over a certain length. Prompted by this legislative declaration, a state
court might reason that, because of these dangers, insurance carriers
in the state are forced to charge higher premiums when trucks
exceed that length. This might lead the court to conclude that, by
capping the length, the legislature meant to indirectly regulate the
relationship between the insurance companies and their
policyholders, the commercial trucking companies. Although this is
an extreme example, it demonstrates how a court’s interpretation of
what might “indirectly” regulate the business of insurance could
quickly expand the scope of the MFA, placing it at odds with a host
of federal statutes and the Commerce Clause.194 The danger of the
MFA running amok is compounded when courts are unwilling to
follow Fabe’s mandate to consider statutory provisions that further
differing interests separately and apply the MFA only to those
provisions that further the interests of policyholders.
This quandary underscores the basic problem with the Kepka
decision. Unlike both the Allen majority and dissent, which at least
attempted to identify provisions that indicated that the Colorado
statute was passed to regulate insurance relationships, the Kepka
193. For the purposes of this illustration, ignore the fact that this extreme example would
patently violate the Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. See, e.g., Raymond Motor Transp.,
Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978).
194. There is an interesting interaction between the Supreme Court and Congress on the
cross-roads between the Commerce Clause, the FAA, and the MFA. Under Allied-Bruce
Terminex Cos. v. Dobson, the Court concluded that Congress passed the FAA intending it to
extend to the full reach of its Commerce Clause authority. See 513 U.S. 265, 276–77 (1995).
It is doubtful that, at a time when federal power was expanding rapidly under the Commerce
Clause, Congress intended to surrender its newly found power back to the states. Hence, in
any given context, courts determining whether a statute was enacted for the purpose of
regulating the business of insurance under the MFA will run up against the pervasive FAA.
This Comment posits that this collision has already occurred in Kepka and Allen, and that
either Congress or the Supreme Court needs to clarify the issue. As discussed in Part IV.B
above, there is little incentive for parties to pursue appellate review in the health care
arbitration context. This serves as support for the argument that Congress should remove this
issue by exempting these agreements from the FAA and saving continued appellate review of
the MFA for other, more logical contexts.
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court summarily concluded that the entire Texas statute was passed
to regulate insurance relationships.195 While it is true that the Kepka
court took notice of the legislature’s findings that the Texas act was
passed to answer skyrocketing malpractice premiums, it is doubtful
that patient protection provisions in the arbitration statute were
passed for this reason, or that these provisions furthered the interests
of doctor/policyholders (or the “insured” to use the Fabe
phraseology).196
The extent to which a state law may indirectly regulate insurance
and avoid preemption under the MFA is not the only ambiguity to
arise out of the Supreme Court’s decision in Fabe when applied to
the health care arbitration context. As noted above, both the Kepka
and Allen courts made reference to the Fabe majority’s holding by
reasoning that a state statute could be enacted for the purpose of
regulating the business of insurance “to the extent” that it regulated
policyholders. Although technically accurate, this characterization is
only half of the story. As mentioned above, the Fabe majority’s
holding also stands for the proposition that, to the extent a law
furthered the interests of other parties besides the insurer and the
insured, it was not enacted for the purpose of regulating the business
of insurance.197 This latter interpretation is supported by the dissent
in Fabe, led by Justice Kennedy, which sharply criticized the duality
of the majority’s “compromise holding.”198 The purpose of a given
statute, argued Justice Kennedy, either “is the regulation of the
business of insurance or is not.”199 Justice Kennedy reasoned that,
read as a whole, the statute considered in Fabe, which covered
insurance company insolvency, applied to all creditors to which
money was owed, not just policyholders.200 Because the statute was
“not limited to entities within the insurance industry,” it did “not
regulate the relationship between the insured and the insurer.”201

195. See In re Kepka, 178 S.W.3d 279, 291 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005).
196. See id. at 289–90.
197. See U.S. Dep’t of Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491, 508 (1993).
198. See id. at 517 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
199. Id. at 518.
200. See id. at 517.
201. Id. (“The statute governs the rights of all creditors of insolvent insurance
companies, including employees, general creditors, and stockholders, as well as government
entities.”).
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Hence, in light of both the Fabe majority and dissenting
opinions, the Kepka and Allen courts both misapplied Fabe, though
in different ways. The Kepka court seemed to ultimately favor the
Fabe dissent’s “all-or-nothing” approach, but probably expanded the
scope of the MFA further than the Fabe dissent would have been
willing to go.202 Because the Texas act in Kepka, and specifically the
arbitration provisions, applied to patients as well as insurers and
policyholders, Justice Kennedy would not have applied the MFA in
Kepka. By contrast, the Allen majority at least paid lip service to the
Fabe majority’s decision to parse the statute into discrete segments,
but then proceeded to apply their reasoning to the whole statute.
Even Justice Kourlis missed the mark by mirroring Justice Kennedy’s
reasoning in his Fabe dissent and concluding that the Colorado act in
Allen did not fall under the MFA because it applied to others outside
the insurance relationship. Because these cases incorrectly applied
Fabe, they fail to provide an example of how a court might properly
dissect a health care arbitration statute and apply the MFA only to
the extent that the provision was passed to regulate an insurance
relationship. This raises the question of whether the MFA is,
necessarily, too blunt an instrument for courts to use to defeat FAA
preemption and allow state statutes to govern doctor/patient
arbitration agreements.
4. Legislative intent and the MFA dilemma
Part of the state court confusion in the health care context lies in
the complexity of prevailing MFA case law, and the fact that Fabe
and its ilk were decided in the anti-trust context.203 A more
important piece of the puzzle, however, concerns the underlying
policy behind state health care arbitration statutes and what they are
meant to do.

202. The Kepka court specifically rejected the defendant nursing home’s reliance on
Union Labor life Insurance Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 129 (1982), and Group Life & Health
Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 210–14 (1979), the very cases that the Fabe
dissent used to determine that the statute in that case did not regulate the business of
insurance. See In re Kepka, 178 S.W.3d 279, 291 n.14 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005); Fabe, 508 U.S.
at 511 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
203. See Fabe, 508 U.S. at 510, 516–17 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“[T]he statutory
question the majority considers with care is difficult . . . .”).
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Utah’s health care arbitration statute provides a useful case study
of general application. If the UHCMA was meant to further the
interests of malpractice insurance policyholders (doctors) and
regulate their relationship with the insurance companies, it would
make sense that it would fall under the MFA’s protection. However,
UHCMA legislative history and case law demonstrate that the
arbitration provisions blend the interests of doctors and patients in
negotiating arbitration agreements, largely stepping into the shoes of
common-law contracts defenses, such as unconscionability.204 Thus,
at least some provisions are meant to further the patients’ interest by
ensuring that the patient is fully informed of the scope of the
arbitration agreement before he or she signs it.
Generally speaking, if a court finds that a given provision in a
state statute is meant to protect patients instead of policyholders,
Fabe probably requires that such provisions be considered separately.
This is true even if an arbitration provision is passed as part of an
overall legislative scheme to reduce frivolous lawsuits and lower
medical malpractice premiums by extension.205 This may seem like
204. See supra text accompanying notes 57–59 (discussing Soriano v. Graul, 186 P.3d
960 (Utah Ct. App. 2008)).
205. Recall that the Kepka court fell into this exact trap—concluding that the entire
Texas act was passed to regulate the business of insurance based on the act’s statement of
legislative purpose. See In re Kepka, 178 S.W.3d 279, 289 (Tex. App. 2005). Ironically, at least
one state district court judge in Utah has made the same mistake in analyzing the enforceability
of arbitration agreements under the UHCMA. See Sonnenburg v. Welling, Civ. No.
070902669 (Utah D. Ct. Feb. 29, 2008) (ruling dismissing defendant’s motion to compel
arbitration) (on file with author). In Sonnenburg, the state district court judge concluded both
that the FAA preempted the UHCMA and that the MFA reverse preempted the FAA,
rendering an arbitration agreement that did not comply with the state law unenforceable. Id. at
9. The defendant in that case had argued that the FAA trumped the UHCMA, making even a
non-compliant arbitration agreement enforceable. According to the defendant, the court
should have read the arbitration provisions separately from the legislative findings. Defendant
further argued that the arbitration provisions dealt with the doctor/patient relationship, not
the relationship between the insurer and the insured. Id. at 7. The court acknowledged that
“the arbitration portion of the Utah act deals with the relationship between patient and
doctor, not insurer and insured.” Id. (citation omitted). Nevertheless, the court concluded that
“it would be incorrect for the Court to extract the arbitration portion of the act from the
reaches of the legislative intent placed upon the entire act.” Id. The court further reasoned that
the legislative findings indicated the Utah Legislature’s intent to indirectly regulate health care
costs. Id. at 7–8. Thus, “the [MFA] reverse pre-empts the [FAA] because the purpose behind
the [UHCMA] was, in part, to regulate the business of insurance.” Id. at 9 (emphasis added).
The above subsections demonstrate that the Sonnenburg court, like the court in Kepka,
misapplied Fabe. Fabe demands that the court apply the MFA only to the extent that it
regulates the interests of policyholders. As a result, the analysis that the Sonnenburg and Kepka
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splitting hairs, but it is an important conceptual distinction because
of the way that Kepka, Allen, and other similar cases have turned
out. Had those courts correctly applied Fabe, they would have
concluded that although their state’s statute was passed to indirectly
regulate insurance premiums, their arbitration provisions actually
furthered the interests of patients, rather than doctors and their
insurance companies. This conclusion would have led those courts to
find that the FAA preempts their state statute and mandates
arbitration. Instead, each time the court applies a statute that was,
according to the court, passed to regulate an insurance relationship
by indirectly lowering insurance premiums, it actually operates to
defeat the doctor/policyholder’s motion to compel arbitration
through reverse preemption, thus countering the legislative purpose
trumpeted by the court. These are outcome-driven decisions by
courts recognizing that these statutes are meant to protect patients,
just like judicially created contract defenses. Thus, the court’s desire
to work equity clouds its ability to correctly interpret health care
arbitration statutes in light of Fabe. As a result, the courts are forced
into the logical inconsistency of using the MFA—which was passed
to protect the interests of policyholders—to tip the policy scale
toward patients and defeat the doctor/policyholder’s motion to
compel arbitration.
Granted, there is a healthy debate over whether, and under what
circumstances, arbitration actually benefits physicians.206 Regardless
courts should have conducted was the very inquiry that they both specifically rejected—parsing
out the portions of the acts that did not further the interests of insureds and refusing to apply
the MFA to those provisions. In addition, in the case of the UHCMA, the Sonnenburg court’s
analysis seemed to utterly overlook the vast amounts of legislative history demonstrating that
portions of the UHCMA were passed to further patient rights. In fact, the portions of the
UHCMA that make the act vulnerable to the FAA—those that restricted enforceability of
arbitration agreements—are the very ones that the Utah Legislature passed to further the
interests of patients, not doctor/policyholders. Thus, the MFA would not apply to those
provisions, and even arbitration agreements that do not comply with the UHCMA should be
enforceable under prevailing federal law.
206. See, e.g., DeVille supra note 6, at 334 (“Ironically, although the innovation is
typically supported with enthusiasm by most medical audiences, it is by no means clear that
arbitration is good for all physicians all the time.”). For an interesting, but ultimately
inconclusive, empirical approach to the supposed benefits of arbitration, see Erik Moller,
Elizabeth Rolph, & John E. Rolph, Arbitration Agreements in Health Care: Myth and Reality,
60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 153, 180 (1997) (“Our research does not permit us to draw any
evaluative conclusions regarding outcomes when binding arbitration agreements are in place.
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of arbitration’s true merits, however, a given legislature that passes
an arbitration statute in answer to the skyrocketing malpractice
insurance premiums must have already found that arbitration helps
decrease those costs.207 Thus, legislative intent becomes the court’s
double-edged sword by which the legislature’s determination that
malpractice arbitration decreases malpractice insurance premiums is
the very thing that will ultimately defeat a doctor/policyholder’s
motion to compel arbitration under the FAA. This may not be so
dangerous where the legislature anticipated and intended this result,
or where courts correctly dissect their state statutes under Fabe.
However, the danger of courts undermining legislative intent
increases exponentially where courts, like Kepka and Allen, misapply
Fabe and greatly expand the range of statutes that are passed “for the
purpose of regulating the business of insurance.”208
The ironic result of the interpretive problems discussed above is
that, although the FAA’s aim was to overcome judicial hostility to
arbitration, the MFA continues to provide state courts a way to
circumvent the FAA’s main purpose. At the same time, state
legislatures have proven effective laboratories to balance the complex
interests of doctors and patients.209 A clear statement from Congress
exempting state health care arbitration statutes from the FAA would
give the green light to states to continue to enact fair and predictable
statutes. It would also prevent state courts from applying the MFA
too broadly, avoiding undue conflict between the FAA and the
MFA. Congress advanced specific policy objectives in passing both
these statutes. Where interpretive trends in the MFA threaten to
swallow the FAA in the health care arbitration context, Congress,
not state or federal courts, should be the body to draw a clear
demarcation line between them.
Our survey results are inconclusive as to whether agreements lead to faster, less expensive,
and/or more satisfying results or whether arbitrators show any biases toward defendants or
plaintiffs.”).
207. Recall too, the above discussion of the “findings and purposes” of the UHCMA. See
supra Part II.B.1. This legislative pronouncement also obviates the stringent need to protect
the “national policy” favoring arbitration under the FAA. If state legislatures have already
found that arbitration will lower medical costs and insurance premiums, they have every
incentive to promote their enforceability. At the same time, state legislatures are in a better
position to balance the competing patients’ rights, a task that has, up to this point, been
fulfilled by state law judges through the unconscionability doctrine.
208. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2006).
209. See supra Part II.
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V. CONCLUSION
In some ways, state health care arbitration statutes have stepped
into the shoes of common-law patient protections, such as
unconscionability. Utah’s UHCMA is one example, demonstrating a
compromise between patients’ rights and statutory solutions to
growing health care costs. However, the FAA threatens to preempt
this and other statutes that restrict the enforceability of arbitration
agreements. Nevertheless, the FAA already acknowledges some state
law “grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of [a]
contract.”210 This Comment has demonstrated that states are willing
and able to legislate in this area. Although Supreme Court case law
views these statutes as hostile to the “national policy” favoring
arbitration, without them, the courts will apply unpredictable
common-law principles in an ad hoc manner to protect patients.
Currently, murky Supreme Court case law and a lack of incentive for
parties to invoke the FAA leave many legal questions unanswered. As
such, some courts have resorted to the MFA to reverse preempt the
FAA and save their state laws. This solution is inadequate. To the
extent that these statutes regulate the relationship between doctors
and patients, they do not regulate insurance, which is necessary to
invoke the MFA. Thus, by sanctioning state statutes in this area,
Congress will help further the “national policy” in favor of
arbitration while still allowing state legislatures to provide courts a
predictable statutory framework to protect important patients’ rights
as well.
James C. Dunkelberger

210. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
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